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Abstract. Tracing the sequence of library and system calls made by a
program is very helpful in the characterization of its interactions with
the environment and ultimately of its semantics. Due to entanglements
of real-world software stacks, this task can become challenging as we
take accuracy, reliability, and transparency aspects into the equation. In
this paper we report on our experience in designing and implementing
API tracing solutions for software security research. We discuss two im-
plementation variants based on hardware-assisted virtualization and on
dynamic binary translation to realize API call interposition robustly.
Keywords: API monitoring, API hooking, call interposition, binary instrumen-
tation, hardware virtualization extensions, malware.
1 Introduction
Modern operating systems come with large, heterogeneous software components
that developers can build on when writing a software program. They expose
their functionalities through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that
compiled code accesses through well-defined prototypes and calling conventions.
The sequence of APIs that a piece of code may invoke during its execution
can be representative of its externally observable behavior, and ultimately of its
semantics. In presence of complex code, however, static program analyses may
fall short in providing an immediate characterization of such high-level behaviors.
Security researchers can resort to dynamic analysis to interpose on API calls.
For instance, monitoring API calls is useful in malware analysis and code reverse
engineering activities to track how an untrusted piece of software interacts with
the surrounding environment [16]. Tracking API calls is also valuable in depend-
ability research, e.g., for run-time monitoring [17] and troubleshooting [20] of
programs. As API monitoring implies an underlying interception mechanism for
calls, the process also goes under the colloquial name of API hooking.
Security researchers and practitioners use different forms of API monitoring,
with implementations tailored to different contexts. For instance, a malware
sandbox may interpose mainly on system calls so to collect in a single spot
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the events of interest, justified by the desire not to miss behaviors exercised by
unaccounted-for library APIs. But when analysts dissect a sample, they resort to
monitoring solutions for library calls to understand how its code achieves some
behavior. Consider an application using an HTTP-related API: intercepting a
packet transmission down in the software stack is not as informative as logging
the API call that originated it. Tracking high-level facts is in general valuable
for many monitoring, troubleshooting, and reverse engineering activities.
Contributions. We observed that prior literature seems to touch only slightly
the design space and the accuracy, reliability, and transparency dimensions of the
API monitoring problem in the general case. Also, we found currently available
tracing tools to often fall short in one or more of these respects. Motivated by
these observations, in this paper we report on our experience in building robust
and accurate tracers, presenting a general design that works for different instru-
mentation technologies and addresses the three above-mentioned dimensions.
Our implementations target Windows applications, covering a large collection
of DLLs and system calls, and can be extended to other systems. We devise
two variants: one builds on dynamic binary instrumentation and can be used
either standalone or as a support library for existing dynamic analysis systems;
the other builds on virtualization extensions for more efficient and transparent
instrumentation, and represents the first open solution of this kind. Although
general-purpose, we incubated them as part of our malware analysis research: the
tricky patterns found in this realm combined with quirks of Windows internals
have been a tough training ground for their development. We make the code from
our project SNIPER available at https://github.com/dcdelia/sniper.
2 Preliminaries
Before describing our tracing solutions, we first present relevant traits of the API
call resolution process in the Windows realm, and illustrate the instrumentation
technologies available to date for implementing an API monitoring system.
2.1 Windows API Resolution and Internals
Windows applications can access functionalities of the surrounding environment
by loading functions from DLL (dynamic-link library) modules. To solve ad-
dresses for external symbols, Windows executables define a static Import Ad-
dress Table (IAT) that the loader populates at run time with pointers to the
desired functions, which are imported from known DLL modules.
Every DLL then maintains an export table for its public functions and storage.
Each entry, dubbed also export, is associated with a relative virtual address
(RVA), that is its offset from the base address of the module. For an executable
importing one or more exports from a DLL, the loader will populate the involved
IAT entries by looking up the corresponding RVAs and summing them with the
base address chosen for the DLL by the system when loading it.
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There are however alternative methods to locate API addresses. A program
may manually load a DLL and locate its exports using the GetProcAddress
API that does not touch the IAT. Furthermore, regardless of how DLL loading
happens, a program may manually solve symbols by navigating the loaded code
modules and parsing their export tables. This happens frequently with applica-
tions wrapped by executable packers and protectors, which are popularly used
in both malicious and benevolent programs [16].
When it comes to the internal structure of a DLL, an exported API can be
of different kinds. The base case is when its logic is fully contained in the code
starting at the given RVA. In other cases the code is partial and ends with a
tail jump to another function (either private or exported) or to an export from
another DLL. The latter case is frequent for instance in kernel32.dll relying on
kernelbase.dll. In other cases the RVA does not point to code, but represents
a forwarder export [33]: this instructs the loader to silently rewire any IAT entry
referencing it to point to another export from another DLL. Due to these factors
it is not always easy to determine what are the “exit points” for an export.
Export tables also do not contain prototype information. Header files from
the Windows SDK specify the calling convention (typically stdcall) and the input
modifier of each function argument, that is, when the parameter identifies an
input (IN) or an output (OUT) value, or both (INOUT) [31]. As argument
passing is by value, an output argument takes the form of a pointer. Headers
also introduce a large number of type aliases and structure declarations.
System calls, or syscalls for short, are normally invoked by a program through
user-space wrappers from ntdll.dll that set the syscall ordinal in register EAX
and trigger a context switch. A program however can elude their monitoring by
extracting the ordinals for the Windows version in use from ntdll.dll and
triggering the switch with custom code, realizing a so-called direct syscall. Expe-
rienced coders can also use undocumented syscalls to make the analysis harder,
and prototypes for them may only be found in reverse engineering forums.
2.2 Instrumentation Technologies
As we will see throughout the paper, the type of instrumentation a tracer uses
to interpose on API calls impacts several dimensions of the hooking process.
When operating in user space, one possibility is to rewire each IAT entry to
point to a stub that logs the call before invoking the intended API function. This
approach, known as IAT hooking, misses however calls to APIs solved without
using the IAT (§2.1). In terms of recall a better alternative is to move instrumen-
tation to the API code, modifying the initial bytes of each monitored function
with the insertion of a trampoline to an analysis stub. A common weakness of
both approaches is that their modifications are visible to an adversary.
Artifacts are a well-known problem for dynamic analyses that operate through
binary patching. For this reason other technologies have gained in popularity in
security research [9]. Dynamic binary translation (DBT) systems can trap ex-
ecution at arbitrary instructions based on their type (e.g. control transfer in-
structions) or address, while providing the running code with the illusion that
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instrumentation is not present. Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) is a pop-
ular DBT technique for user-space monitoring of programs [5, 9, 29]. When an
analysis has to deal with system-wide or kernel-level flows, researchers have used
whole-system emulators like QEMU [3] as a DBT system to instrument entire
virtual machines. Virtual machine introspection (VMI) tools then come into play
to overcome the semantic gap when inspecting high-level features of the under-
lying OS and processes by reading the raw memory of the guest [13].
The advent of CPU virtualization extensions (VT) has recently favored new
instrumentation schemes with better performance and transparency. By main-
taining a split view of code and data in the Extended Page Table, Deng et
al. [11] show how to create invisible breakpoints for registering analysis callbacks
at specific instruction addresses. To insert a breakpoint they create a code page
used only for instruction fetching, while the original bytes are left untouched in
a data page available for read/write operations: this design defeats introspective
attacks by an adversary. Modern sandboxes like [26] use variants of this mech-
anism to hook system calls and few selected library calls. Later on we will see
however that lazy loading mechanisms and other OS entanglements can get in
the way when one wishes to use this technology to trace calls to arbitrary APIs.
3 Design Space
In this section we identify general problems in API tracing systems and discuss
fundamental aspects in the design space of such a system to cope with them.
3.1 Challenges in API Monitoring
When starting our project we observed that publicly available, general-purpose
API tracing systems fall short in one or more of the following aspects:
[C1] Transparency. Adding probes or other instrumentation for intercepting
calls to an API may introduce artifacts that an adversary can look for [16].
[C2] Recall. The points in the software stack where instrumentation takes
place also determine how many of the actual calls a tracer can capture,
as we have seen for instance with the limitations of IAT hooking (§2.2).
[C3] Coverage. Tracing parameter values used in an API call is more informa-
tive than tracing API names alone. This requires a programmatic approach
to extract prototypes and non-primitive data type declarations for an ample
universe of libraries, so to avoid retrieving incomplete information.
[C4] Output values. A tracer should capture the return value of an API call,
but also any data written by it to output buffers supplied by the caller.
[C5] Relevance of calls. A tracer should filter out intra- and inter-component
calls that happen down the software stack: these internal calls make up for
a large fraction of the logs but are not informative for users.
[C6] Derived flows. A tracer should cover derived execution flows such as
child processes and remote threads injected in other processes, as an ad-
versarial program may use them to hide API calls from the analysis [23].
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Tracing system Technology Test T1 Test T2 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
API Monitor v2α-r13 IAT hooking 7 3
SpyStudio v2.9.2 Trampolines 3 7
WinAPIOverride 6.6.6 Trampolines 3 7
drltrace [40] DBI 3 3
PyREBox [7] QEMU-TCG 3 3
SNIPER DBI, VT 3 3
Table 1. Commodity tools and research systems with generic API tracing capabilities.
Circles are filled to indicate if an aspect is met to a basic, good, or optimal extent.
We observe that [C1, C6] are compelling in several security settings, [C2-4]
impact the soundness and completeness of API monitoring-based analyses, and
[C5] affects the usability of the system when a human agent is involved. To come
up with robust solutions for API tracing, we reasoned on the key factors behind
these challenges and how a hooking design can meet them. In particular, we
wanted to pursue accuracy and reliability in the tracing process without tying
the design to an instrumentation technology (and its transparency properties).
For [C1] as threat model we assume that the software under analysis may
run tests that perform checksumming operations on its code and data (T1), and
verify the integrity of DLL code loaded in memory by comparing it with its
counterpart on disk or using precomputed signatures (T2). Both behaviors are
often found in malware and in programs shielded by executable protectors [1].
We wrote an adversarial program that for test T1 compares each IAT entry of
the running program with the expected address for its symbol (found in the
export table of the DLL exporting it), and for T2 reads the DLL contents from
disk to a buffer, applies relocations (to match where Windows loaded the real
DLL), and compares the first 8 bytes of every imported DLL symbol with our
copy. Test T1 will expose stubs for IAT hooking, and T2 hooking trampolines.
In Table 1 we report the outcome of the two tests on three popular tracing
products used by security professionals and two open-source research tools based
on DBT. The first three products were reliably detected by our program. We
defer the discussion of the [C2-6] dimensions for the five tools to §4.5, since in
order to better understand it we first need to detail the key points of our design.
3.2 Scope of Monitoring
Prototypes. We mentioned that a DLL only provides names and relative locations
of its exported functions. For obtaining parameter information a sound way to go
is to cross-reference exported names with function declarations from the header
files of the Windows SDK1: the Deviare engine [34] offers an infrastructure to
this end. This approach is general and can be applied also to third-party libraries
when their headers are available. The programmatic extraction shall include the
size of each parameter (pointers require a recursive valuation), as it is needed to
fetch values at run time. Input modifiers are not present in headers, but shall be
extracted from the MSDN documentation using a crawler [42].
1 Plus manually assembled headers for undocumented structures and syscalls.
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Relevant calls. We then reasoned on what would make a traced call informative
for a user [C5]: internal calls happening within a DLL or spanning multiple
modules do not provide valuable insights to the user, but only describe how the
OS implements the outer high-level API that triggers them.
We define the scope of a call relevant when the call is made in code belonging
to the program under analysis and eventually returns to it. This definition rules
out internal calls or jumps to other exports, and redirections within API code
(§2.1), but captures syscalls that programs invoke from their code. By program
under analysis we mean the process where the code first runs, the child processes
and remote threads it creates, and any recursive byproducts [C6].
3.3 Hook Insertion and Accuracy of the Tracer
As part of its working, a tracer interposes on specific events: obviously the invo-
cation of an API (API entry event), and the moment it returns to its caller (API
exit) for output values [C4]. The placement of hooks through instrumentation
affects both the recall of a tracer [C2] and call parameter extraction [C3, C4].
API entry events. Given a generic program, a static analysis to determine where
it may invoke an API is not straightforward; obfuscations and anti-analysis mea-
sures make this problem harder [16]. A reliable choice to intercept an API entry
event is thus to monitor when execution reaches code from an API function.
One way is to interpose on control transfer instructions: for instance, PyRE-
Box hooks every call and jmp in the code and checks their target against a list of
API addresses. This approach unfortunately introduces unnecessary overhead for
transfers unrelated to APIs (which are dominant) and may miss unconventional
patterns2. It also requires an instrumentation facility that can hook instruc-
tions by type as the CPU sees them during fetching, ruling out static rewriting
(self-modifying code breaks it [9]) and VT-assisted instrumentation.
We argue instead for placing instrumentation in the prologue of API func-
tions: for a DLL loaded in memory we hook every unique RVA that appears in
its export table and is not a forwarder. For a forwarder we instrument then the
function hosting its actual code. This combination maximizes recall [C2].
API exit events. Intercepting when execution returns to the caller of an API is
needed to log return values and output arguments [C4]. Figure 1 depicts two
viable options to catch API exit events: (a) placing hooks at DLL load time on
the exit points of each API, or (b) doing that dynamically—during an API entry
event—for the instruction located at the return address for the call.
Strategy (a) of chasing exit instructions is not immediate due to the redirec-
tions present in many API implementations (§2.1). Based on the insights from
analyzing Windows DLLs, we wrote a static analysis that processes partial im-
plementation stubs and tail calls in APIs to determine the exit points. We found
2 Consider for instance a push-push-ret sequence: it writes the return address and the
address of the API to invoke to the stack and uses ret to trigger the transfer.
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exotic cases where an export makes a tail call to an export from another DLL
that in turn leads to a tail call to another export from a third DLL.
Strategy (b) of chasing return addresses looks easier at first, but the hooking
logic should be carefully designed to process only a real API exit. In fact, the
instruction following the call may be a join point in the control flow graph, and
later on be reached from basic blocks that do not end with an API call. We found
many instances of this pattern for example in Microsoft utilities (Appendix A).
Unless a program contains a pathological number of these patterns, strategy
(b) is more attractive as it brings fewer invocations of the analysis callback for
API exit events, as our design discards internal calls. In fact strategy (a) would
trigger the callback also for them, and analysis code has to ignore them.
Choosing one scheme over the other has no impact on the other components
of the design, but depends mainly on the capabilities and efficiency the chosen
instrumentation technology: we detail this aspect in §4.3 and explain why the
two schemes may profitably coexist in the development of a tracer.
Parameter extraction. To support retrieval of input and output arguments for
an API call, the instrumentation facility should expose the CPU and memory
context to the tracer. Upon API entry events, the stack pointer value suffices to
locate the arguments under the 32-bit stdcall (Windows) and cdecl (UNIX-like
systems) calling conventions. 64-bit code requires accessing dedicated registers
for the first 4 parameters, and any additional one is passed via stack. For exit
events the return value is available in register EAX (plus EDX for wider data
types). 64-bit output parameters passed in registers can be saved safely during
the entry event. Prototype information is essential on both entry and exit for
computing offsets for stack arguments by taking into account their size and order.
4 Implementation
Figure 2 portrays our tracing proposal, which embodies what emerged from the
discussions of the design space from the previous sections. We now detail its DBI
and VT-based implementations in their common traits and distinctive features.
4.1 Instrumentation Technologies
The design options outlined in the previous sections are general, that is, they
can be implemented over different instrumentation technologies. Choosing one
technology over another however can lead to transparency concerns [C1].
We implement the first variant of SNIPER in Pin [29], a popular DBI choice
in programming language, software testing, and security research. The variant
ships as a high-level library suitable either for standalone usage as an in-guest
API monitoring tool, or for being plugged in existing analysis systems based on
Pin, which are numerous in security research [9] and other fields as well.
The DBI abstraction ensures that every address or value manipulated by
the program matches the one expected in a native execution. Under the hood,
8 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
…
call RegQueryValueExW
mov ecx, eax
…
smith.exe
0x13B1A19
0x13B1A1F
RegQueryValueExW
…
cmp [ebp+lpReserved], esi
jnz loc_xxx
kernel32.dll
…
ret
…
ret
0x77E33218
0x77E33247
0x77E3324A
0x77E33294
0x77E33327
Strategy (b): return address
à onEntry: 0x77E33218
à onExit: 0x13B1A1F
Strategy (a): exit points
à onEntry: 0x77E33218
à onExit: 0x77E33294,0x77E33327
Fig. 1. Handling API calls under strategy (a) and (b) for exits. Arrows represent hooks.
Monitor DLL
loading
Hook
insertion
Blacklist of 
return ranges
Interval tree
onEntry
callback
RVAs of DLL
export 
tables
Database of 
prototypes
prototype
onExit
callback
Program 
memory & regs
Code of
API functions
Dynamic hook 
for strategy (b)
Static hook for 
strategy (a)
hard-coded 
pointer (no 
DB lookup)
Action
Input
Shadow
stack
Fig. 2. Bird’s eye-view of the proposed design.
Pin operates by JIT-compiling and instrumenting code in a designated cache
area: any hook we insert will not be visible to introspective attempts from the
threat model of [C1] (§3.1). We also augment Pin with recent mitigations for
DBI artifacts [9]. These factors contribute to making our tracer less conspicuous
than commodity tools operating in user space through binary patching (§2.2).
The second variant brings a new piece to the research landscape: a tracer com-
patible with modern designs for efficient out-of-guest analyses via VT extensions.
This variant is particularly suitable for scenarios where minimal invasiveness is
desirable (e.g., with code sensitive to environment artifacts [26] or slowdowns [6])
and for monitoring system-wide flows. We build on the VMI features of lib-
vmi [27] and the invisible breakpoints (§2.2) of DRAKVUF [26], a whole-system
analysis framework based on the Xen hypervisor. Although DRAKVUF can ac-
commodate generic analyses, its standard hooks monitor every active process
and presently are mostly confined to selected syscalls for malware analysis.
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4.2 Relevant Calls and Execution Units
In §3.2 we mentioned the advantages of restricting tracing to calls explicitly
made by the program under analysis [C5]. The first dimension of the problem
is however to identify processes and threads relevant to this end [C6].
Pin operates on a single process, but offers APIs to intercept the creation
of a child process or a remote thread in an existing process [9]: we use them to
extend the instrumentation to such flows automatically.
In the VT-based scenario the object of the analysis is the entire system,
so we carry out a bookkeeping work to identify relevant execution units. We
wrote a component that, starting from a process under analysis, tracks the cre-
ation of child processes and remote threads recursively. To this end we hook
the NtCreateThreadEx and NtTerminateThread syscalls, walking the _EPROCESS
and _ETHREAD structures to retrieve the involved thread IDs. We maintain a
pool of monitored threads and when execution hits an invisible breakpoint from
a hook, we check from the raised callback whether the current execution unit
belongs to the pool. In case of code injection patterns, this design also lets us
ignore activities from the “authentic” threads of a victim process.
We can then rule out internal calls happening in Windows components [C5]
by checking in which region the return address of an API call falls. We observe
that a whitelisting approach for code regions belonging to the program can be
a slippery road: not only malware and protected executables, but even COTS
programs can exercise exotic behaviors like executing code from the heap or
change section permissions [6]. We find it safer instead to build a blacklist of
return ranges for calls to discard, and populate it with code section addresses of
Windows DLLs by intercepting their loading and unloading. This scheme turned
out to be robust and efficient: as intervals are disjoint, we use an interval tree
with logarithmic lookup cost. We complement the range lookup operation with
ad-hoc measures for DLL tail jumps (§2.1) that we present in the next section.
4.3 Hook Insertion and Callbacks
API Entry. As motivated in §3.3, we target RVAs of exported symbols from
loaded DLLs in order to place hooks that interpose on API entry events.
DBI engines offer facilities to intercept system loader activities. Once we
identify the base address of a DLL module of interest, we locate its export table,
cross-reference the names of exported functions with a database of prototypes3,
and compute the run-time addresses of such APIs using their RVAs.
We instrument the first instruction in each function and register an onEntry
analysis callback, hard-coding the address of the prototype information for the
API as argument to avoid a run-time lookup. This approach is independent of
the Windows version in use, and has performance advantages as we can use the
IMAGE mode of Pin to place efficient ahead-of-time instrumentation [22].
3 The authors of PyREBox released a large DLL database that we use and refine in a
few respects, e.g. to correctly distinguish INOUT arguments from OUT ones.
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function onEntry(threadID, ESP, prototype, ...):
1 if *ESP ∈ RangeBlacklist then return
2 SStack = getTLS(threadID) // thread-local storage
3 if not SStack.empty() then
4 cInfo = SStack.peek() // recorded call information
5 if *ESP == cInfo.ra && ESP == cInfo.esp then return
6 hookReturnAddress(*ESP) // skip under strategy (a)
7 removeStaleEntries(SStack, ESP) // starting from top while cInfo.esp ≤ ESP
8 SStack.push(<*ESP, ESP, prototype>) //<ra, esp, prototype> call info
9 parseArgsOnEntry(ESP, prototype, ...)
function onExit(threadID, ESP, EIP, EAX, ...):
10 SStack = getTLS(threadID)
11 if SStack.empty() then return
12 idx = SStack.size() - 1
13 cInfo = SStack[idx]
14 while true do
15 if cInfo.ra == EIP ‖ - -idx < 0 then break
16 cInfo = SStack[idx]
17 if idx == -1 then return
18 if ESP == cInfo.esp + 4 + cInfo.prototype.retN then
19 parseArgsOnExit(cInfo.esp, cInfo.prototype, EAX, ...)
20 SStack.resize(idx) // pops one or more elements
Fig. 3. Analysis callbacks executed upon API entry and exit events.
In the VT-based scenario we can equally parse export tables for RVAs, or load
precomputed Rekall profiles [36] for the current Windows version. We insert an
invisible breakpoint at the first instruction in each function, associating to it an
onEntry analysis callback with the address of its prototype information as hard-
coded argument. Compared to the DBI case, the callback will first determine
whether the intercepted thread belongs to the pool of threads to be monitored.
Invisible breakpoints operate on physical pages: adding instrumentation to
logical addresses requires their translation to physical ones. As Windows imple-
ments a lazy loading mechanism, when we intercept a DLL loading event not
all its pages may be amenable to hook insertion: put in other words, for a given
logical address there might be no physical page yet [14]. We wrote a component
that loads DLLs of interest in a separate process and reads code from their sec-
tions forcing page materialization: since such pages are normally shared among
processes, we can place hooks also for the program of interest. This scheme still
misses a few corner cases, but luckily other researchers concurrently developed
a mechanism to force page faults and materialize pages upon DLL loading [15],
using a new feature of libvmi that meanwhile became available. We have started
to extend our implementation to integrate their technique.
onEntry callback. The analysis callback takes as input the value of register ESP
(to access the return address and parameters on the stack), a pointer to the
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prototype information for the current API, and further registers where needed
(e.g., with 64-bit code). We provide its simplified pseudocode in Figure 3.
We maintain a thread-local shadow call stack of currently monitored func-
tions4. Line 1 restricts logging to calls made in user code, or we would be mir-
roring also API calls within DLLs. Line 5 discards internal jumps and tail calls
to other exported functions, which would see the same return address in pro-
gram code of their caller (current top stack entry). Line 6 deals with hooking
the return address when we use strategy (b) for handling API exit events. Line 7
performs sanitization of stale stack frames in case of instrumentation glitches
(if ESP is at higher addresses than the ones stored, those calls likely returned
already since the stack grows downwards to lower addresses). Finally, lines 8
and 9 update the shadow stack and log the call, respectively.
API exit events In §3.3 we presented two strategies for tracing API returns:
hooking exit instructions (a) or return addresses (b). For strategy (a) we can
place hooks at DLL load time at the exit points identified with static analysis,
while for strategy (b) we place them dynamically upon API entry events (line 6).
In the VT-based scenario invisible breakpoints naturally backed both strate-
gies, as they can target arbitrary addresses. For Pin strategy (a) was initially the
only efficient option: Pin lacked a neat way to place hooks on specific instructions
during execution without resorting to heavy-duty features like TRACE mode,
while its ROUTINE mode has known reliability issues for catching routine ex-
its [22]. Once the PIN RemoveInstrumentationInRange API became available
with Pin 3.2, we implemented strategy (b) by forcing Pin to recompile and re-
analyze only the instruction at the return address. Such recompilation is needed
only the first time a new return address is hit at line 6: as we will explain shortly,
the analysis callback will ignore any subsequent spurious raises of the hook.
In §3.3 we also mentioned that strategy (b) reduces the fraction of times the
onExit callback is invoked for uninteresting events that have to be discarded.
There could be cases however where it may be more intrusive for the program
under analysis (e.g., due to recompilation events in Pin), or an adversary knowing
the details of the system may tamper with return addresses on the stack. We
retain support for both schemes and leave the choice to the user. The two can
coexist seamlessly for instance when dealing with a new DLL or function for
which we did not precompute exit points: we can instrument the return addresses
for such calls, and use the other scheme for the rest of the APIs. This choice also
helped us when developing the VT-based version, as for some exit instructions
the insertion of an invisible breakpoint in DRAKVUF failed with no apparent
reason, but we could fall back to hooking return addresses for that API.
4 We use the plural as within a thread the concurrently active functions that return
to user code may be multiple: this happens for instance when a program (e.g., a
malware sample) dynamically loads a custom DLL file with LoadLibrary and its
DllEntryPoint function invokes one ore more APIs before LoadLibrary returns.
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onExit callback. The analysis routine initially looks for the most recent stack
entry matching the current return address, represented by the instruction pointer
EIP. The pseudocode shown in Figure 3 is for strategy (b): for this reason lines 11
and 17 can be hit when a previously hooked return address is reached by blocks
that did not make an API call (§3.3). This logic is semantically equivalent to
turning off instrumentation at the return address, which may not always be
cheap (and we wanted to minimize recompilations in Pin). A sanity check at
line 18 compares the current ESP value against the one stored by onEntry for
the frame, “undoing” the effects of the return instruction5. We observed that in
practice simply checking for ESP > cinfo.esp is a reliable approximation.
Once we located the shadow stack entry for the current API call, we invoke
the routine for processing the return value and output parameters, passing to it
the stack pointer value seen on entry, register EAX and where needed EDX for
the return value, and any saved output arguments for 64-bit code.
For using strategy (a) we can see that, as the callback would trigger on an
exit point, the instruction pointer EIP has not been diverted yet to the return
address (which can be found however at *ESP), and the stack pointer has not
been adjusted with the displacement associated with the return sequence. We
can then adapt the code reported for onExit in Figure 3 by replacing EIP with
*ESP at line 15 and by using ESP == cinfo.esp as condition at line 18.
Parameter extraction. The routines called by onEntry and onExit at lines 9
and 19, respectively, are conceptually similar. Both may have to locate data
from the stack, computing offsets based on the size of each previous argument
in the prototype. Logging primitive types is straightforward, while in the case of
pointers we need to distinguish the type and size of a pointed object, but first
of all verify whether a pointer is meaningful, i.e., if it points to valid data.
Ideally, a sound way would be to take into account the API semantics (e.g.,
check its return code to discriminate errors), but this may be unrealistic for a
general-purpose tracer. We check instead if the pointed object falls into valid
memory and call a print helper for its contents. This check is immediate for
fixed-size objects such as primitive types or structures. For variable-size objects
like strings we cannot rely on the presence of some terminator when an API fails:
we conservatively fetch a predefined amount of bytes from the address, reducing
it if the resulting chunk would span two pages with the second being invalid.
4.4 System Calls
In the presentation we postponed the discussion of how our implementations
address syscalls, as there are some unique aspects to their handling. From the
5 After the return, the stack pointer value will be higher than the ESP seen by onEntry
by r+N bytes: r=4 for 32-bit code and 8 for 64-bit code, while N is the space used
on stack in argument passing for stdcall APIs (in Windows APIs it is the callee’s
responsibility to clean the stack for the caller), and zero for cdecl functions.
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program’s perspective syscalls are self contained: they happen between two con-
text switches (to kernel mode when invoked, back to user mode upon termina-
tion), and no shadow stack update is needed. For prototype information we use
the database from the DrSyscall module of the DynamoRIO DBI system [5]: it
covers many undocumented syscalls, and also auxiliary data for distinguishing
the parameter type for cases where it depends on another parameter of the call.
DBT systems can intercept when context-switching instructions are about to
execute. In Pin we register two analysis callbacks for syscall entry and exit events:
from there we extract the syscall ordinal, retrieve the corresponding prototype
from the DrSyscall database, and extract the parameters for the call. In the
VT-based scenario we cannot interpose on instructions by type, but we follow
the design proposed by the authors of DRAKVUF and detailed in [26], that is,
we instrument the entry and exit instructions of syscalls in the NT kernel of
Windows (e.g., ntkrnlpa.exe when Physical Address Extension is enabled).
We deem a syscall relevant if it returns either to program code directly (as
with direct sycalls commonly found in malware) or to some Nt library wrapper
from ntdll.dll that was called from program code. For the latter case we walk
back the stack mimicking the effects of the epilogue instructions of the wrapper:
we check if the stack frame of the method returns to program code or to an
address in the DLL range blacklist, discarding the call in the second case.
4.5 Comparison with Other Tracing Solutions
We can now resume the discussion of Table 1. User-space monitoring solutions
(first three entries) introduce classic artifacts [C1] and have other limitations.
In terms of recall [C2] no one can catch direct syscalls, API Monitor misses
calls to API solved without using the IAT, and SpyStudio hooks only a selected
number of APIs used deeply in the software stack. The three tools have accurate
prototypes [C3], and can trace output arguments [C4] as their stubs wrap API
returns too. Filtering out internal calls is a task for the user [C5]. Processes
are traced as a whole, and users have to add child and injected processes to the
monitoring manually (or using filters in WinAPIOverride) [C6].
drltrace and PyREBox fare well in terms of artifacts [C1], as they use DBT
for hooking: drltrace builds on DBI with DynamoRIO, while PyREBox uses
whole-system QEMU-TCG emulation. drltrace iterates on export tables to hook
API prologues [C2] like we do. As limitations, it supports fewer APIs than
other tools [C3], does not trace return values and output parameters [C4], and
can only follow child processes [C6]. It has automatic filtering capabilities for
internal calls [C5] by whitelisting the text and heap regions (we mention possible
pitfalls in §4.2), but does not expunge tail transfers used for internal calls.
PyREBox interposes on every call and jmp instruction to hook API en-
try events [C2]: as explained in §3.3, this can add important overheads to the
(already high) ones of QEMU [8]. PyREBox has a remarkable collection of pro-
totypes [C3] that we borrow, and logs output parameters by hooking ret in-
structions in the execution [C4]. For internal calls users may only specify manual
filtering policies for calls across specific pairs of libraries [C5]. For derived flows
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# of syscalls # of DLL calls DLL APIs (from progr.) Avg call processing time (µs)
from
progr.
internal
from
progr.
internal
distinct
write
out args
avg #
of args
program code internal syscalls (int.)
Subject tail normal onEntry onExit onEntry enter exit
APT28 0 408 045 50 577 1 934 1 153 200 130 29 3.20 14.38 15.76 3.16 3.28 2.33
BlackSquid 0 12 172 4 667 988 55 715 151 38 2.82 17.42 17.81 14.27 10.76 3.71
Furtim 88 1511 541 371 2 365 887 71 25 2.49 16.53 30.79 2.69 3.61 4.27
Gootkit 0 3 068 4 737 4 478 31 507 79 23 1.37 5.61 8.27 8.69 4.17 2.86
Gozi-ISFB 19 1 509 13 449 11 019 22 180 75 28 1.54 5.60 6.45 3.18 4.13 9.45
Grobios 4 419 225 144 1 275 27 10 2.97 19.18 27.17 5.39 6.36 2.40
Olympic 0 1 129 434 298 4 726 64 26 3.26 18.38 23.36 4.59 8.22 16.83
SmokeLoader 15 485 49 27 1 019 28 10 3.94 29.50 21.20 9.86 5.39 2.53
softpulse 1 1 552 1 163 628 10 702 83 26 2.82 15.37 20.65 8.61 6.39 2.44
Swisyin 0 7 058 55 21 81 456 22 8 4.38 27.52 20.76 3.47 17.17 1.83
Untukmu 0 105 646 23 978 21 195 4 459 691 25 8 2.19 10.63 11.29 2.51 3.46 1.92
7zip 0 28 398 5 922 294 139 152 112 26 3.80 24.36 23.37 4.55 3.89 2.41
BitTorrent 0 113 742 268 804 109 608 913 214 366 109 2.73 16.44 16.87 4.98 6.83 3.26
Chrome 1 821 263 839 1 586 718 684 236 755 054 398 145 2.99 19.68 21.56 8.83 9.21 2.64
Foxit Reader 2 150 490 946 903 205 319 818 568 396 93 3.45 17.78 19.69 4.33 5.23 2.12
Notepad++ 0 315 440 2 955 873 1 645 034 725 638 231 36 2.04 8.63 10.57 3.90 3.15 2.24
TeamViewer 0 307 126 489 341 52 778 1 795 308 328 87 3.36 21.75 23.95 4.22 6.75 7.80
Table 2. API calls recorded on malicious samples and common productivity software.
[C6] it follows child processes and conservatively monitors any process that the
program interacts with via NtOpenProcess, while our solution is less noisy as it
tracks only injected threads, ignoring the normal activities of a victim process.
5 Experimental Results
Validation. To debug and stress our implementations we initially used system
utilities and programs shipped with Windows, as they use heterogenous and
numerous APIs and occasionally syscalls. We then ran and verified the logs for
deterministic programs such as the conformance tests of the Wine emulator, tools
for assessing the transparency of malware sandboxes (as they exercise many low-
level, occasionally undocumented primitives), and synthetic tests that we wrote
and wrapped with state-of-the-art executable protectors. Our tracers currently
run on top of Pin 3.11, Xen 4.12, and DRAKVUF commit 376c03d, and can
track up to nearly 19K distinct APIs from 194 DLLs, and 446 syscalls.
Statistics. In Table 2 we report figures from running 11 malware samples (used
in a recent work [10] for their assorted anti-analysis patterns) and 6 classic pro-
ductivity programs. We tracked APIs from 12 popular DLLs covering differ-
ent OS features: advapi32, crypt32, gdi32, iphlpapi, kernel32, kernelbase,
ole32, oleaut32, shell32, user32, wininet, and ws2_32.dll. For our tests
we used an Intel i9-8950HK CPU, 3 GB of RAM, Windows 7 SP1 build 7601
32-bit, and strategy (b) for handling API exits. The DBI and VT-based variants
yielded consistent results in the events they recorded. We observed no significant
changes when repeating the experiments under Windows 10.
The collected figures back the importance of distinguishing calls originat-
ing in program code from internal ones [C5], as the latter may be orders of
magnitude more numerous. Syscalls from program code are few, but can re-
veal interesting details: for instance, for the Furtim malware they were critical
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for analysts to understand its adversarial strategies [10, 37]. For DLL functions
we divide internal calls into normal and tail-call invocations: the ability to dis-
card tail calls in onEntry (line 5) seems valuable, as they can be as numerically
relevant as calls from program code (e.g., Gootkit, Gozi-ISFB). The table also
reports how many distinct DLL APIs program code invokes, how many of them
have output arguments, and the average number of arguments of all kinds from
their prototypes. Output arguments seem relevant in practice [C4], as they are
present in 15–40% of the APIs that we observed.
We then measured the time spent in executing our callbacks. The numbers
shown in Table 2 refer to analysis code only, as probe insertion is a well-studied
problem in DBI and VT-based research [5,11,17] that leaves us little optimization
room. For DLL functions invoked from program code the average processing
time was 5-31 µs for each API entry or exit event, with an apparent correlation
with the number of arguments to process. Filtering out internal calls is cheaper:
onEntry takes 3–15 µs to terminate after the range (line 1) or the tail call (line 5)
check; onExit executes faster—likely due to locality effects—and we omit figures
for it since hardly significant (<1 µs). As for syscalls, we report figures only for
internal ones as they are dominant. Note that enter analysis includes the cost of
verifying the return address (§4.4). The extra cost when logging the arguments
for syscalls from program code was in the order of a couple dozens of µs.
6 Discussion
Limitations. Our design does not make use of primitives restricted to specific
instrumentation technologies. For this reason it is amenable to different imple-
mentations, and we chose6 two systems that can cope well with the threat model
of [C1] and the other requirements [C2-6]. Our design does not counter evasions
targeting the peculiarities of the underlying chosen system. For this well-studied
problem the implementation can resort to existing mitigations, such as patching
the Time Stamp Counter in the VM monitor upon VM exit events [4], or hiding
DBI runtime artifacts as we did by using the mitigation library of [9].
Kawakoya et al. in [23] resort to taint analysis for an adversarial model
for API monitoring where an attacker can evade hooks by emulating with own
instructions the initial portion of an API before jumping in the middle of its
canonical implementation. We can cope with popular forms of such stolen code
attacks by moving the hook from the initial instruction of an API to a later
basic block (for instance, one that post-dominates the entry block in the control
flow graph) where parameters are still visible. The authors also consider code
injection attacks to elude monitoring using other processes: we tackle this surface
6 Instrumenting QEMU for whole-system analysis did not seem appealing to us, as
native execution of VT-based schemes is faster and brings fewer artifacts. We fore-
see however no major obstacle to accommodate our design: popular QEMU-based
projects like [8] offer infrastructure to hook specific addresses that we could borrow,
and our VMI-based thread tracking mechanism would work in QEMU as well.
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by tracking child processes and remote threads. As we already hook system APIs,
the implementation can be extended to recognize new exotic injections [25].
Our tracers are deceived by non-standard library loading. One attack de-
scribed in [23]—and countered by the authors using disk-level taint analysis—
consists in copying a system DLL to a non-standard path and obfuscating the
symbols in its export table before loading. [24] describes a more complex attack
where the adversary reimplements the Windows loader, and recursively rewires
every import referencing other DLLs to use stealth copies of such libraries, so
that calls to “standard” API functions are never made in the program. As fu-
ture work we are thinking of exploring the countermeasures suggested in [24] to
extend our design and handle also these attacks against API name resolution.
Other Related Works. For dynamic analysis of binary programs researchers
have used for a long time designs operating alongside the object of the analy-
sis. In the context of monitoring the interactions with environment, systems of
this kind have ranged from operation-specific tracers (e.g., [32]) to full-fledged
sandboxes. A common strategy was to patch the functions of interest [16]. Mi-
crosoft Detours [21] offered general API hooking primitives based on trampolines
to invoke a user-defined function, for instance to sanitize sensitive arguments.
Similarly, in its day the pioneering CWSandbox [41] replaced the first 5 bytes of
each API under observation with a trampoline to an analysis callback.
Code changes and artifacts introduced by such approaches worried researchers
and practitioners [16]. In a seminal work [18] Garfinkel and Rosenblum proposed
to move an intrusion detection system from the guest to the VM monitor, using
VMI techniques to inspect the guest with better transparency and isolation. VMI
was later adopted in many other scenarios, first and foremost malware analysis
and memory forensics. Ether [12] pioneered low-artifact malware analysis with
a system based on VT extensions with syscall tracing capabilities. Many works
(e.g., [11]) have then followed in its footsteps, with important contributions in
terms of improved transparency and flexibility.
To the best of our knowledge, SNIPER is the first attempt to extend VT-
based monitoring to user-space API calls in an automated, general-purpose man-
ner. Our project shares similarities with hprobes [17], a framework that uses VT
extensions for warm hook insertion in user space. The work discusses three soft-
ware dependability case studies: an emergency exploit detector, a watchdog, and
an infinite-loop detector. To insert hooks hprobes overwrites instructions of in-
terest with int3: this causes a VM exit upon execution, and the VM monitor
kicks in to carry out the analysis. We find hprobes to serve a purpose orthogonal
to ours, as it means to back generic, user-supplied analyses for specific events.
The technique is also not transparent to checksumming attempts [C1].
This limitation is shared by designs for secure hook insertion inside a VM with
OS modifications (e.g., [35, 38]), which are alternative to invisible breakpoints.
Recent developments in this area [28,39] feature more efficient isolation using the
VMFUNC feature of VT extensions but introduce distinguishable code artifacts.
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Dynamic binary translation systems are a popular choice for security analyses
that require fine-grained instrumentation capabilities, such as tracking instruc-
tions by their semantics (e.g., reading memory) or performing substantial code
modifications. DBT systems usually offer better transparency and flexibility than
binary patching [9], although they may incur emulation artifacts [30]. A recent
work [19] uses DBI for real-time function call detection for the internal functions
of a program. Unlike API functions, entry points for those are not declared in
the executable. The authors show how to scrutinize control transfer instructions
to identify function calls reliably. It would be interesting to compare this ap-
proach in terms of recall and efficiency with a solution combining our design for
on-entry hooks with recent advances for function detection in binaries [2].
7 Conclusions
API monitoring is a valuable technique in many security scenarios. We have
shared our experience in tracing solutions for Windows binaries and their multi-
faceted universe of challenges, discussing general design options amenable to dif-
ferent implementation technologies. We also detailed the first tracer that builds
on VT extensions, today popular for their efficiency and transparency. Our tech-
niques are general: they make no assumption on how a program is compiled or
obfuscated, but only on the calling conventions in use. Thus they may be applied
also to other systems such as Linux and MacOS with some adaptations for the
structure of libraries and their loading. We hope our readers will find the design
points and technical insights presented in the paper useful for their research.
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A Additional Material
In §3.3 we have mentioned that when chasing return addresses with strategy (b)
to hook API exit events, the instruction corresponding to the return address for
some API call may be a join point in the control flow graph of the caller. If we
insert a hook there and do not remove it after the call terminates—for instance
because hook deletion brings overhead that we wish to avoid—the analysis call-
back should distinguish whether it is intercepting a real API exit event.
In the example below, taken from the 32-bit calc.exe shipped with Win-
dows 7 SP1 64-bit (file version 6.1.7601.17514), we instrumented the instruction
at address 10020cf when we first intercepted the call to the LocalFree API
(kernel32.dll) from its enclosing function. However, subsequent invocations of
the latter eventually reach this address also from another basic block, namely
the entry block, which does not end with an API call. The logic of the analysis
should discard these events: our implementation would not find a valid shadow
call stack entry for it. We found other instances of this pattern in calc.exe (e.g.,
at 100367e, 100aaba, and 100cec3) and in several other Windows utilities.
Fig. 4. Address 10020cf in calc.exe is a join point in the control flow graph of its
enclosing function: it can be reached either by a conditional jump from the entry basic
block of its function, or as a fall-through for the call to the LocalFree API function.
